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ADAPTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION 
AND REGTECH: A CONCEPT ARTICLE ON 
REALISTIC PROTECTION FOR VICTIMS OF 
BANK FAILURES 
LAWRENCE G. BAXTER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Frustrated by the seeming inability of regulators and prosecutors to 
hold bank executives to account for losses inflicted by their companies 
before, during, and since the financial crisis of 2008, some scholars 
have suggested that private-attorney-general suits such as class action 
and shareholder derivative suits might achieve better results. While a 
few isolated suits might be successful in cases where there is provable 
fraud, such remedies are no general panacea for preventing large-scale 
bank-inflicted losses. Large losses are nearly always the result of 
unforeseeable or suddenly changing economic conditions, poor 
business judgment, or inadequate regulatory supervision—usually a 
combination of all three. 
  Yet regulators face an increasingly complex task in supervising 
modern financial institutions. This Article explains how the challenge 
has become so difficult. It argues for preserving regulatory discretion 
rather than reducing it through formal congressional direction. The 
Article also asserts that regulators have to develop their own 
sophisticated methods of automated supervision. Although also not a 
panacea, the development of “RegTech” solutions will help clear away 
volumes of work that understaffed and underfunded regulators cannot 
keep up with. RegTech will not eliminate policy considerations, nor will 
it render regulatory decisions noncontroversial. Nevertheless, a 
sophisticated deployment of RegTech should help focus regulatory 
discretion and public-policy debate on the elements of regulation where 
choices really matter. 
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FOREWORD 
It is a privilege and pleasure to participate in a symposium 
dedicated to my distinguished friend and colleague, Jim Cox. I have 
always been in awe of Jim’s prodigious scholarship and the reputation 
he has rightly earned as the nation’s leading market-regulation 
authority. Jim’s concern for the victims of market misconduct has been 
persistent and forceful, perhaps even at the cost of opportunities that 
might have brought him greater financial reward and political prestige. 
I can only hope that my somewhat perverse approach to the problem 
of bank failures does not disappoint him for being insufficiently 
aggressive toward bankers and the banking markets. I know his 
friendship would never allow him to show that disappointment, even if 
he felt it. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the lingering aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, popular 
anger about the damage wrought on the economy and individual 
welfare still simmers.1 This anger visibly flared up again in the 2016 
presidential election process.2 Financial companies, particularly as 
 
 1. The continuing level of public anger is quite remarkable. Five years after the 2008 crisis, 
reports of this anger were quite commonplace. See, e.g., Michael Erman, Five Years After 
Lehman, Americans Still Angry at Wall Street: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wallstreet-crisis-idUSBRE98E06Q20130915 [https://perma.cc/
682M-RA3S] (summarizing the results of an extensive poll of public opinion). Yet even in the 
2016 presidential election, the impact of the 2008 crisis continued to loom large, and reform 
proposals thought to be necessary were important policies on the agenda of both presidential 
nominees and even played a role in the polarization of politics abroad. See, e.g., Victoria Stilwell 
& Sarah McGregor, Angry Americans: How the 2008 Crash Fueled a Political Rebellion, 
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Mar. 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/
2016-03-01/the-angry-americans-trump-sanders-and-the-aftershocks-of-2008 [https://perma.cc/
L5TQ-682H] (discussing the impact of this anger on presidential campaign platforms); Amir Sufi, 
Thank the Financial Crisis for Today’s Partisan Politics, EDUC. POST (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.educationpost.com.hk/resources/mba/160715-mba-insights-thank-the-financial-crisis-
for-today-s-partisan-politics [https://perma.cc/ZCJ4-WX2D] (discussing the dynamics of anger 
directed at the 2008 crisis and how this anger has led to deep political polarization). 
 2. President-elect Donald Trump and the Republican Party platform added a call for 
restoring the divide between commercial and investment banking, to the consternation of big 
finance supporters within the Republican Party. See, e.g., Donna Borak, GOP Platform Calls for 
Revival of Glass-Steagall, WALL STREET J. (July 19, 2016, 6:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/gop-platform-calls-for-revival-of-glass-steagall-1468876558 [https://perma.cc/NGY2-98
5D]. Then-nominee Hillary Clinton vowed to impose stricter regulation on big banks. See id. For 
a survey of the political events leading to the insertion of a call for reform in the platforms for 
both parties, see Pam Martens & Russ Martens, Both Democrat and Republican Platforms Have 
Had It with Frankenbanks, WALL STREET ON PARADE (July 19, 2016), http://wallstreetonparade.
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embodied by big banks and Wall Street, are the primary objects of this 
public fury. In this motif, bankers have become banksters and banks 
have become too big to jail—even in the view of some judges and 
commentators.3 Regulators have been excoriated for being captured or 
at least asleep at the switch in their failure to prevent the 2008 crisis 
and for bailing out some of the world’s biggest banks and other 
financial companies. 
The wreckage following the 2008 crisis is strewn with individual 
and multiparty lawsuits and complex multigovernment and multiparty 
settlements. Billions of dollars have been paid out by banks and other 
financial companies as reparations for securities frauds and violations 
of the federal False Claims Act.4 Yet successful private  
class action suits5 against financial institutions have actually been few 
and far between,6 and a majority of the crisis-related actions have 
 
com/2016/07/both-democrat-and-republican-platforms-have-had-it-with-frankenbanks [https://
perma.cc/KBN5-5WG4].  
 3. One of the most prominent judicial critics is U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff. See, e.g., 
Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-
executive-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/M9S5-L7MZ]. Former federal prosecutor Bill Black has 
waged a relentless attack on what he terms “banksters.” See, e.g., William K. Black, Hillary, the 
Banksters Committed ‘Fraud,’ Not ‘Shenanigans,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/hillary-the-banksters-com_b_9164930.html 
[https://perma.cc/UDZ6-4QWF].  
 4. A long string of enforcement actions against banks has developed in the aftermath of the 
2008 crisis. Most prominent among these are fines for Libor violations and violations of tax 
regulations and anti-money-laundering legislation. See, e.g., BSA-AML Civil Money Penalties, 
BANKERSONLINE, https://www.bankersonline.com/penalty/penalty-type/bsa-aml-civil-money-
penalties [https://perma.cc/79VS-ACG9] (providing an ongoing record of Bank Secrecy Act and 
Anti-money-laundering regulation violations by banks); Tracking the Libor Scandal, N.Y.  
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 23, 2016, 8:49 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactice/
2015/04/23/business/dealbook/db-libor-timeline.html/#time370_10900 [https://perma.cc/K2L2-
PXUV] (providing ongoing reporting of the actions against banks and bankers for Libor 
violations); Robert W. Wood, More Banks Spill Tax Evasion Secrets to Avoid Criminal  
Charges, Account Holders Beware, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/11/20/many-banks-avoid-u-s-tax-evasion-charges-
hunt-for-americans-continues/#3e2627be1cc4 [https://perma.cc/F9FT-F274] (listing the many 
banks that have been subject to enforcement actions for helping clients evade taxes). 
 5. For purposes of this Article, private class action suits and shareholder derivative suits are 
treated as the same type of remedial pursuit. 
 6. For annual reports tracking and analyzing class action filings and settlements, including 
those against financial-sector companies, see Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A 
Collaboration with Cornerstone Research, STANFORD LAW SCH. & CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
http://securities.stanford.edu [https://perma.cc/2QTL-XH35]. According to Clearinghouse data, 
courts saw roughly two hundred class action filings between 2007 and 2011 involving claims 
related to the credit crisis. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
FILINGS—2012 YEAR IN REVIEW 3 fig.2 (2013) (listing credit-crisis-related class actions over 
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failed.7 Amid a perception that regulators and prosecutors are either 
incapable of taking or unwilling to take sufficient remedial action to 
punish financial miscreants and render victims of financial wrongs 
whole, critics have suggested that private-attorney-general suits and 
shareholder derivative suits might be the best complement to a 
generally deficient enforcement regime.8 
This potential solution to regulatory and prosecutorial 
shortcomings has a facial attractiveness. Class action suits can often dig 
where regulators have not gone or sometimes cannot go. Even the 
extensive inspection powers of regulators might not always uncover 
information secured in discovery and depositions. In the private 
litigation tradition, such suits can build upon actual events and delve 
further, subjecting a complex train of events leading to financial loss to 
the rigor of discovery, trial, and the judgment of peers. Even when 
settled before trial, such suits can not only secure reparations but also 
 
time). The Clearinghouse analyses determined that “credit-crisis filings have significantly lower 
settlement rates compared to non-credit-crisis filings.” CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION FILINGS—2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2011). And the group’s 2015 analysis 
reported that credit-crisis-related filings have higher dismissal rates and slightly lower settlement 
rates compared with class actions in general. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION FILINGS—2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 13 (2015). 
 7. The most prominent of these cases is FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 310 
(4th Cir. 2015), discussed further in note 24 below. Very few 2008-crisis-related class action 
lawsuits appear to have survived dismissal motions, reached a jury, or even been settled. One case 
reached a jury verdict, leading to a partial award in the plaintiffs’ favor, but this verdict was 
subsequently set aside by the Eleventh Circuit for absence of evidence indicating that losses were 
caused by securities fraud and not the overall market conditions leading to the 2008 crisis. 
Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 730 (11th Cir. 2012). See generally, e.g., 
Christopher J. Miller, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of Dismissal 
Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (2011) (observing 
that the very fact of the 2008 crisis has made it more difficult to be successful in financial securities 
fraud suits because losses can be attributed to economic conditions broader than those over which 
the defendants have control).  
 8. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex 
Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008) (arguing, in the context of securities regulation rather 
than bank regulation, that securities class actions play a vital role in preventing regulatory power 
from concentrating solely in corporate actors); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private 
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (advocating a 
strengthening of the mechanisms of private class action litigation as an important supplement to 
regulation in the modern administrative state); Melanie Gray, Vanessa Chandis & Kristen M. 
Echemendia, Striking the Right Balance: Public Versus Private Enforcement Laws—What Will We 
Learn from This Financial Meltdown?, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 449 (2010) (making the case that 
private enforcement actions are a necessary complement to public regulation); Mark Klock, 
Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for 
Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 437 
(2011) (advocating broader use of private-attorney-general suits to foster a stronger culture of 
integrity and ethical conduct in the auditing profession). 
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operate to shape future financial conduct. Being privately funded, class 
action suits are neither dependent on government appropriations nor 
susceptible to industry capture. These advantages appear to be as good 
as confirmed by the hostility toward them on the part of industry 
organizations.9 Thus, in an era of widespread regulatory failure, class 
action suits seem to offer a private, ex post solution that might actually 
function as the “dark matter” of regulation—perhaps overlooked, but 
integral to the system. 
Yet traditional bank regulation itself no longer offers a generally 
effective way to prevent or diminish widespread financial collapse. 
Although, as emphasized below, such regulation plays a continuing and 
vital role in cabining financial institutions within accepted risk 
frameworks, it has also become highly formalized. This is a 
consequence of public and congressional anger during and after the 
savings-and-loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, in which regulatory 
enforcement powers were intensified and a range of unsafe bank 
activities were criminalized or made more easily actionable.10 The 
formalization process, in turn, helped to promote a public view that 
bank failures are usually the result of fraudulent activity, and this 
transformation in opinion might have led some to the view that 
shareholder derivative and class action suits should become important 
elements in bank safety regulation.11 As this Article argues, such a view 
is based on a mistaken understanding of most of the activities and 
actions that lead to bank failure. In reality, effective bank supervision 
and the prevention of bank failure involve a constant series of difficult 
 
 9. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS? (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/
Securities_Class_Actions_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/US45-7PBB]. 
 10. A series of major statutes were passed in the wake of the S&L crisis in the 1980s, the 
failure of a number of national banks into the 1990s, and rising concerns about money laundering 
by drug cartels, each of which in turn provided political momentum for increasing the intensity of 
public regulation over financial institutions. These statutes, coupled with numerous implementing 
regulations, were the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) 
(reorganizing the fragmented enforcement powers of the bank regulatory agencies and 
substantially strengthening them); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) 
(introducing the preemptive power of “prompt corrective action”); the Crime Control Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) 
(authorizing prejudgment assets attachments); and the Annunzio-Wylie Money-Laundering Act 
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code) (adding 
money laundering as the basis for regulator enforcement powers to remove bank officers and 
directors). 
 11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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judgments, much akin to the “business judgments” covered by the 
business judgment rule,12 and failures in such decisionmaking very 
seldom constitute actionable fraud. The ineffectiveness of private 
enforcement actions such as shareholder derivative and class action 
suits leaves open the question of how we might impose mechanisms for 
avoiding or reducing the risk of serious financial failure. This Article 
argues that public regulation cannot be replaced but should instead be 
modernized, using the advances of technology (“RegTech”), to enable 
regulators to keep up with the very rapid evolution of markets and 
their underlying technological development. 
I.  WHY CLASS ACTION SUITS CAN PROVIDE ONLY LIMITED RELIEF 
The class action–private-attorney-general model cannot perform 
the functions some might expect of it. This is because that model is 
based on a framework directed at market misconduct, a framework 
that is both unsuitable to and incapable of influencing bank 
performance in ways that really would prevent bank failure and serious 
consequential losses to customers, clients, taxpayers, and the general 
public. The private-attorney-general model, in which securities-fraud 
and shareholder-derivative-suit litigants provide ex post retribution for 
failures in financial decisions, cannot address what is necessary to avoid 
or at least minimize the consequences of bank failure or emergency 
bank bailouts. Not only is such litigation ex post, taking place long after 
the disaster has occurred, it is also focused on specific institutions and 
not the overall systemic role of financial institutions.13 Avoiding the 
consequences of bank failures can only be achieved by a combination 
of real market discipline and either adequate bank regulation or a 
massive restructuring encompassing the financial industry and perhaps 
the entire economic system—if such avoidance is attainable at all. 
Economic markets, financial and otherwise, are complex systems that 
are not well reformed by sporadic, ad hoc litigation. 
 
 12. See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 13. The nature of shareholder derivative and private-attorney-general suits is that they are 
ex post: as a fundamental standing requirement, they can only take place after the damage has 
occurred. 
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A. Nature of Financial Markets 
Financial markets are inherently dynamic and volatile.14 Existing 
in a state of constant and rapid revolution, they are quintessential 
complex adaptive systems.15 The inherently volatile nature of financial 
markets is primarily attributable to their position at the center of a web 
of interconnected markets. National and global banking markets are 
intertwined, not only with each other but also with a far-flung, 
convoluted, and even more labile “shadow banking system” that itself 
forms many different boundaries and textures in different parts of the 
great global market. 
Banks are also intimately connected with governments, 
themselves subject to rapidly changing political preferences. Banks are 
important participants in the huge government-debt market.16 They are 
 
 14. Santa Fe Institute Economist W. Brian Arthur states this well: “The economy is a vast 
and complicated set of arrangements and actions wherein agents . . . buy and sell, speculate, trade, 
oversee, bring products into being, offer services, invest in companies, strategize, explore, 
forecast, compete, learn, innovate, and adapt. [This represents] a massively parallel system of 
concurrent behavior.” W. BRIAN ARTHUR, COMPLEXITY AND THE ECONOMY 2–3 (2015). Such 
understanding of financial markets is now commonplace, with vast swaths of academic and 
scientific writing addressing the complex adaptive nature of these markets. Complexity science is 
now gaining a strong foothold, even in official thinking about how markets should be regulated. 
See, e.g., Nicholas Albertini, The US Treasury OFR and CFPB: A Paradigm Shift to Complexity 
Economics, OPEDNEWS (Mar. 11, 2012, 8:14 AM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-US-
Treasury-OFR-and-CF-by-Nicholas-Albertini-120307-137.html [https://perma.cc/8PPY-MXSS] 
(reporting on the adoption of complexity-science thinking by key financial regulators in the U.S. 
federal government); U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN 
ULTRA-LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 7−12 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/289012/11-1223-dr4-global-financial-
markets-systems-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/S39S-VHDE] (providing a U.K. government 
analysis describing global financial markets as a complex “system-of-systems” (emphasis 
omitted)).  
 15. The pioneering work by Arthur and others at the Santa Fe Institute stands out in helping 
us understand economic markets as complex adaptive systems possessing the features of 
dynamism, power laws and fragility, network codependence, and contagion. See, e.g., ARTHUR, 
supra note 14, at 1–29 (explaining the “complexity economics” approach); Lawrence G. Baxter, 
Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 
31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 852–68 (2012) (outlining the features of complexity science and 
the extensive literature on this subject). For some accessible and leading thinking on the 
application of complexity science to bank regulation, see generally Stefano Battiston, J. Doyne 
Farmer, Andreas Flache, Diego Garlaschelli, Andrew G. Haldane, Hans Heesterbeek, Cars 
Hommes, Carlo Jaeger, Robert May & Marten Scheffer, Complexity Theory and Financial 
Regulation, 351 SCIENCE 818 (2016); Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in 
Banking Ecosystems, 469 NATURE 351 (2011).  
 16. When serving as “primary dealers,” the trading counterparties of governments in their 
implementation of monetary policies, see Primary Dealers List, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html [https://perma.cc/R35F-QP85], 
banks around the world create the very markets that buy the debts that governments issue. See 
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key elements in the management of the money supply and the 
provision of liquidity in international, national, and local economies.17 
For example, banks are central to the implementation of national 
housing policy18 and indispensable to government when a large 
financial institution has to be rescued. Notwithstanding the popular 
belief that they are “private” entities, in many important respects 
banks are “instrumentalities of the state” and very salient, tangible 
extensions of the sovereign.19 
Our models of regulation and private litigation, however, fail to 
address this market reality. We aspire to the ideals of the rule of law, 
which, in the expectations of many participants in the financial 
markets, are interpreted as requiring a framework of bright-line rules 
and prohibitions stipulated in advance as the “rules of the game.” 
These rules and prohibitions provide the basis for regulatory 
enforcement actions and private litigation. Yet there is nothing 
“bright-line” about financial markets, at least beyond evanescent 
moments, nor has there ever been. The participants in financial 
markets consist of a wide array of individuals and institutions who 
are—even with the best of intentions—still strategic agents. They 
constantly adapt to rules in a giant and continuous revelation of 
“Goodhart’s Law,” which articulates the ephemeral nature of any form 
 
generally, e.g., Marco Arnone & George Iden, Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy 
Issues and Selected Countries’ Experience (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/03/45, 2003), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0345.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK2Y-YX3T] 
(detailing how a primary-dealer system operates and cataloguing the primary-dealer systems of 
various nations). 
 17. See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, Banks as Liquidity 
Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking, 57 J. FIN. 33, 33−35 
(2002). 
 18. In the United States, for example, national housing policy, which is designed to promote 
home ownership, is heavily dependent on the interaction between banks and the government-
sponsored enterprises that provide the guarantees supporting asset securitization. See generally, 
e.g., Nicola Cetorelli & Stavros Peristiani, The Role of Banks in Asset Securitization, FRBNY 
ECON. POL’Y REV., July 2012, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/
epr/12v18n2/1207peri.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2P4-37RE] (describing “the principal roles in 
securitization”).  
 19. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 15, at 818–25. 
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of “target regulation.”20 Anticipatory or prophylactic command-and-
control regulation quickly falls out of sync with market reality.21 
Private ex post lawsuits, based on violations of law and probable 
legal standards, must demonstrate causes of action that point to 
relatively clear breaches of law, such as fraud or statutory violations. A 
reversal by the Second Circuit of civil fraud awards entered against 
Bank of America, N.A.; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.; and 
Countrywide Bank, FSB demonstrates how very difficult it is to obtain 
a determination of fraud in financial suits.22 Exacting standards for 
proving intent to commit fraud apply, and these standards are almost 
never met.23 Even where intent can be pinpointed within the 
organization, in attempting to meet such standards of proof, fraud suits 
also cannot prevail in the face of the business judgment rule, which 
respects the fact that market participants must exercise discretionary 
 
 20. Goodhart’s Law has acquired this name in reference to an observation by London School 
of Economics economist Charles Goodhart that target regulation is inherently self-defeating 
because strategic action will be taken to work around the targets. For an analysis of the operation 
of Goodhart’s Law, see generally K. Alec Chrystal & Paul D. Mizen, Goodhart’s Law: Its Origins, 
Meaning and Implications for Monetary Policy (Nov. 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.cyberlibris.typepad.com/blog/files/Goodharts_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8H3-TD
MC].  
 21. Market discipline, the theory that market participants indirectly “police” each other 
when they act in their own interests, helps to keep these rapidly evolving markets rational. 
However, the market discipline theory also has its weaknesses, insofar as it depends on equal 
bargaining power, complete information transparency, and an absence of fraud. Market 
discipline, therefore, is reliant on effective regulation to be effective. For an example of the 
shortcomings of market discipline, see generally David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market 
Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015). Market participants are also able to quickly “work 
around” rules. See Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’ 
Response to Government Aid, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 1–2, 20 (2014) (demonstrating that by making 
subtle changes in their portfolios to increase the risks of specific assets, banks are able to increase 
income while staying within regulatory guidelines, even though their resulting portfolios are much 
riskier); Emily Flitter, Emails Show JPMorgan Tried to Flout Basel Rules: Senate, REUTERS (Mar. 
14, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-whale-basel-idUSBRE
92D19Y20130314 [https://perma.cc/T6WT-EXS2] (summarizing a Senate report that found that 
the bank’s risk methodology was adjusted to achieve results contrary to the spirit of the regulatory 
prohibitions). 
 22. United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 666 (2d 
Cir. 2016), rev’g 83 F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In the trial court, the financial institutions 
had been found liable by a jury for mail and wire fraud under an explicit statutory provision in 
FIRREA § 951, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012). Id. at 653–55. For more examples of cases bolstering 
the complaint that banks and their executives are not held accountable, see supra note 7. 
 23. See Countrywide, 822 F.3d at 656–66 (detailing the extensive evidentiary requirements 
for both common law and statutory fraud, as well as the insufficiency of the government’s proof 
in the case). 
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judgment in the face of constantly evolving circumstances.24 For 
example, a court recently explained that “corporations are expected to 
take risks and their directors and officers are entitled to protection 
from the business judgment rule when those risks turn out poorly.”25 
Where “defendants do not display a conscious indifference to risks and 
where there is no evidence to suggest that they did not have an honest 
belief that their decisions were made in the company’s best interests, 
then the business judgment rule applies even if those judgments 
ultimately turned out to be poor.”26 But it is defaults of business 
judgments, not fraud, that are almost always the most important when 
large individual institutions fail, particularly when these institutions are 
caught in the vortex of a systemic crisis.27 Such institutions are usually 
able to withstand episodic frauds as long as they are not sufficiently 
massive to destroy enough capital to plunge the institution into 
bankruptcy, as occurred in the failure of Barings Bank in 1995.28 
 
 24. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974) (discussing the presumption 
of bona fides on the part of directors). A recent case, FDIC ex rel. Cooperative Bank v. Willetts, 
although later partially vacated by the Fourth Circuit based on a different reading of the rule, 
illustrates the business judgment rule’s power. The court noted: 
Cooperative’s pursuit of the challenged loans was in furtherance of Cooperative’s goal 
to grow to a $1 billion institution and stay competitive with other regional and national 
banks making substantial inroads into its territory. . . . The record can simply not 
support a finding that the defendants’ business purpose fell so far beyond lucid 
behavior that it could not even be considered “rational.” Although there were clearly 
risks involved in Cooperative’s approach, the mere existence of risks cannot be said, in 
hindsight, to constitute irrationality. 
FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844, 851 (E.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, vacated in part sub nom. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2015). 
Willetts was partly vacated by the Fourth Circuit on evidentiary grounds. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 314. 
For a discussion of the similar hurdles faced by shareholder-derivative-suit litigants attempting to 
seek recompense for excessive executive compensation, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 309, 2016). See also, e.g., Cent. Laborers’ 
Pension Fund ex rel. JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. Dimon, 638 Fed. App’x 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(discussing the protections afforded to directors taking good-faith actions, irrespective of how ill-
advised those actions may have been). 
 25. Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 851 (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. (citing State v. Custard, No. 06-CVS-4622, 2010 WL 1035809, at *22–23 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 19, 2010)). 
 27. As Professor Samuel Buell has observed in his work on the difficulties of holding firms 
and their employees accountable for fraud in the criminal context, “[t]he lines can be very fine 
between ordinary commerce and criminal wrongdoing.” SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL 
OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 40 (2016). 
 28. Trader Nick Leeson placed wrong-way bets in an attempt to recover trading losses, 
inflicting such great losses over a few weeks (more than £800 million) that his bank, Barings, 
collapsed and had to be sold by the Bank of England to ING. For an example of a recent review 
of this spectacular episode of fraud, see James Titcomb, Barings: The Collapse That Erased 232 
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B. Traditional Banking Regulation 
This is not to say that regulation therefore must also fail. For the 
entire period of bank regulation, the factor that has rendered 
prophylactic command-and-control regulation effective, or even 
possible at all, is discretion. Banking regulators wield large swaths of 
discretion in ways that are largely invisible to the public. For example, 
they are constantly monitoring loan-loss provisions by individual 
institutions and assessing whether these provisions are realistic in light 
of fluctuating economic conditions. They assess the adequacy of bank 
capital levels on an ongoing basis and evaluate whether these levels are 
sufficient in light of the portfolios of the specific institutions in question 
and the particular events and conditions they face—events and 
conditions that perpetually change as markets and external events 
change.29 Apart from the amorphous nature of the phenomena that 
must be taken into account, it is also true that there have very seldom 
been sufficiently clear breaches of law for private suits to prevail. 
Where private suits have been successful, there have been provable 
breaches of clearly defined or well-settled law.30 
 
Years of History, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11427501/Barings-the-collapse-that-erased-232-years-of-
history.html [https://perma.cc/U4DZ-5WSC].  
 29. Regulators maintain hundreds of full-time staff (field examiners) who work permanently 
on-site at most, if not all, of the big banks, and these supervisors spend their days ensuring, as far 
as they can, that banks comply with regulatory guidelines and rules. For an outline of the process, 
and the difference between regulation and supervision, see Thomas Eisenbach, David Lucca & 
Robert Townsend, The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time, FED. 
RES. BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY STREET ECON. (Apr. 12, 2016), http://libertystreeteconomics.
newyorkfed.org/2016/04/the-economics-of-bank-supervision-so-much-to-do-so-little-time.html 
[https://perma.cc/C782-D76U]. See also, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, The Regulator Down the Hall: Fed 
and Comptroller of the Currency Bolster the Banks of Staffers ‘Embedded’ at Nation’s Biggest 
Banks, WALL STREET J. (June 20, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702
304763704576394610591065334 [https://perma.cc/PW8M-92FE] (providing both statistics and an 
illustrative graphic on the prevalence of this practice). Banks also have to file a wide range of 
reports on their activities, and these are monitored remotely for discrepancies and 
noncompliance. One example is the currency transaction report that must be filed whenever a 
payment transaction for more than $10,000 is made by a customer on any one business day; these 
reports are filed electronically and monitored by a federal government agency looking primarily 
for signs of criminality such as money laundering. See, e.g., Currency Transaction Reporting–
Overview, FED. FIN. INST. EXAM. COUNCIL: BANK SECRECY ACT/MONEY-LAUNDERING 
INFOBASE (2014), https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_017.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5G96-G99Q]. 
 30. Nearly all suits are settled before trial, so the exact concessions by defendants are not 
usually disclosed, but for the suits to be brought at all they have to be based on some kind of 
alleged securities fraud. For example, JPMorgan Chase & Co. paid $4.5 billion to settle mortgage 
claims brought against it by a group of investors who alleged that JPMorgan’s misrepresentations 
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The banking regulators are engaged with the industries they 
oversee in ways that are much deeper and more interactive than is the 
case with most other types of regulators.31 They continuously monitor 
and supervise their charges, quite literally on a daily and even hourly 
basis, even evaluating the strategic business decisions made by a bank’s 
management.32 The authority that bank regulators wield is part of the 
quid pro quo for banks to receive certain benefits, including 
participation in the depositor guarantee system that we call federal 
deposit insurance (all banks), the benefits of a national charter 
(national banks), and the security of membership in the Federal 
Reserve (state member banks and all national banks). The bank 
regulators possess and exercise extensive chartering, visitation, and 
enforcement powers that require them to condition, observe, react to, 
and nudge daily bank operations. 
One of the primary missions of a bank regulator is to prevent bank 
failure. This is known as “safety-and-soundness” supervision. Banks 
considered to be acting in unsafe or unsound ways, as well as those that 
have lapsed into conditions that are unsafe or unsound, are subject to 
intense scrutiny by government regulators. Banks constantly modify 
their operations in reaction to regulatory supervision and formal 
examinations. In the rare cases where they do not respond 
appropriately, recalcitrants are subject to the regulators’ vigorous and 
very extensive enforcement powers. 
 
had caused them to buy instruments whose risks were not properly disclosed (that is, fraud). See 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, For JPMorgan, $4.5 Billion to Settle Mortgage Claims, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013, 6:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/jpmorgan-
reaches-4-5-billion-settlement-with-investors [https://perma.cc/2Y4N-67Z3].  
 31. Market-conduct regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) also have some “prudential” regulatory responsibilities, but these are much less 
significant than those discharged by the primary bank regulators. For an explanation of the broad 
visitorial powers of federal bank examiners, see infra note 34. 
 32. For a typical example of the kinds of factors taken into account by regulators, such as the 
ongoing concerns of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regarding strategic 
risks and other risks undertaken by banks, see generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE FROM THE NATIONAL RISK COMMITTEE (Spring 
2016), http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/semi
annual-risk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMP7-
9NNJ]. Since the S&L crisis, regulators have become much more intrusive in their assessments of 
managerial decisions by banks. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? 
The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 210 (1993) (describing how intrusive the regulations promulgated in 
the wake of the S&L crisis had become). 
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This system was most memorably described by Justice Brennan in 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,33 one of the great classics 
involving bank antitrust law. Justice Brennan viewed the system as a 
remarkable example of close interaction between the banks and the 
regulators who maintained the constant supervision of the banks and 
the health of the banking system.34 
Notwithstanding the skepticism expressed so often nowadays, this 
system of supervisory regulation has, if anything, become significantly 
more intense. Large banks house hundreds of examiners from the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve on their 
premises, and a good deal of the monitoring takes place remotely via 
automated reporting, the filing of call and periodic reports, and 
information sharing among different regulatory agencies.35 
II.  PRUDENTIAL REGULATION VERSUS MARKET- 
CONDUCT REGULATION 
Banks, in other words, are not only subject to the requirement that 
they abide by the law in these markets; they are also subject to 
 
 33. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 34. See id. at 329–30. Justice Brennan wrote: 
[P]erhaps the most effective weapon of federal regulation of banking is the broad 
visitorial power of federal bank examiners. Whenever the agencies deem it necessary, 
they may order “a thorough examination of all the affairs of the bank,” whether it be a 
member of the [Federal Reserve] or a nonmember insured bank. Such examinations 
are frequent and intensive. In addition, the banks are required to furnish detailed 
periodic reports of their operations to the supervisory agencies. In this way the agencies 
maintain virtually a day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system. And 
should they discover unsound banking practices, they are equipped with a formidable 
array of sanctions. If in the judgment of the FRB [Federal Reserve Board] a member 
bank is making “undue use of bank credit,” the Board may suspend the bank from the 
use of the credit facilities of the FRS [Federal Reserve]. The FDIC has an even more 
formidable power. If it finds “unsafe or unsound practices” in the conduct of the 
business of any insured bank, it may terminate the bank’s insured status. Such 
involuntary termination severs the bank’s membership in the FRS [Federal Reserve], 
if it is a state bank, and throws it into receivership if it is a national bank. . . . As a result 
of the existence of this panoply of sanctions, recommendations by the agencies 
concerning banking practices tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of 
formal compliance proceedings.  
  Federal supervision of banking has been called “[p]robably the outstanding 
example in the federal government of regulation of an entire industry through methods 
of supervision. . . . The system may be one of the most successful [systems of economic 
regulation], if not the most successful.” To the efficacy of this system we may owe, in 
part, the virtual disappearance of bank failures from the American economic scene. 
Id. (sixth and seventh alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 12 U.S.C. § 325 
(2012), then quoting 12 U.S.C. § 301, then quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a), then quoting 1 DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.04 (1958)). 
 35. See supra note 29. 
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prudential regulation, which is distinct from (though often linked to) 
market-conduct regulation. Prudential regulation focuses on the 
wisdom of financial decisionmaking and management,36 while market-
conduct regulation focuses on whether markets are fair and whether 
participants are trying to cheat. Indeed, bank regulators are now 
officially referred to as “prudential regulators” to distinguish them 
from market regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).37 
The convoluted legislative framework of financial regulation has 
generated some exceptions to this distinction, but as a general rule the 
distinction has become critical to modern banking regulation. 
Safety-and-soundness regulation, however, introduces a unique 
component into the banking business. Whereas it is generally assumed 
that management, boards, and shareholders have a free hand in 
business so long as they refrain from violating external constraints 
expressed in laws and regulations, banks are monitored much more 
continuously and closely. Banks’ actions are subject to persistent 
scrutiny through the process of regulatory supervision of their 
condition, their managers’ conduct, and even certain decisions that 
might otherwise be thought of as business judgments.38 When banks 
incline toward unsafe or unsound activities, or when they lapse into an 
unsafe or unsound condition—for example, when a bank allows its 
 
 36. See generally Vincent P. Polizatto, Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: 
Building an Institutional Framework for Banks 2 n.4 (World Bank Pol’y, Planning, and Research 
Complex, WPS 340, 1990), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/389501468764981235/
Prudential-regulation-and-banking-supervision-building-an-institutional-framework-for-Banks 
[https://perma.cc/B6PP-2G7P] (“Prudential regulation refers to the set of laws, rules, and 
regulations which is designed to minimize the risks banks assume and to ensure the safety and 
soundness of both individual institutions and the system as a whole. Examples include lending 
limits, minimum capital adequacy guidelines, liquidity ratios, etc.”); id. at 4 (“Prudential 
regulations establish the outside limits and constraints placed on banks to ensure the safety and 
soundness of the banking system. They are the key elements to prevent, limit or stop the damage 
caused by poor management.”). 
 37. For example, the Commodity Exchange Act specifically defines “prudential regulator” 
to encompass the banking regulators. Commodity Exchange Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(39) (2012). 
Section 6b-1 of the Act allocates exclusive enforcement authority for most bank derivatives 
activities to the “prudential regulators,” id. § 6b-1, and other provisions of the Act provide for 
special treatment by “prudential regulators” of banks’ swap activity and minimum capital and 
margin variation requirements, id. §§ 6s(d)−(e), 6r. 
 38. In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) 
significantly extended the safety-and-soundness powers of the prudential regulators, to the point 
that one might regard these powers as permitting regulators to intrude into the business 
judgments of banking institutions. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1811). See generally, e.g., Baxter, supra note 32 (discussing the intrusive nature of 
the FDICIA safety-and-soundness regulations). 
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capital or funding levels to drop below the point where it can recover 
from unexpected economic shocks or losses, or when a bank becomes 
vulnerable to sectoral downturns after concentrating its lending too 
heavily within a particular economic sector, as has been the case with 
the oil market over the past few years39—it is the job of regulators to 
nudge them back to soundness or, if these efforts are unsuccessful, to 
take increasingly formal enforcement action. These measures 
commonly occur throughout the life cycle of the bank. 
Banks and their regulators are therefore locked in an interactive 
embrace as business decisions unfold. This is perhaps one of the 
reasons why “regulatory capture” assumes such significant dimensions 
in debates concerning banks—regulators are so closely involved that it 
often may be correct to assume that bank regulators are unduly 
influenced by their protégés.40 This close involvement could also be the 
reason for so much public and political ire toward regulators, whom we 
instinctively feel should have prevented bank failure. 
Yet it is this symbiotic relationship that renders bank mistakes so 
difficult to condemn. Not only must a litigant overcome the business 
judgment rule, which requires judicial deference toward management 
decisions made in good faith, but often she must also deal with the fact 
that much of what a bank has done has already been addressed and 
even condoned by its regulators. To this extent, there is a whiff of 
“indemnity” surrounding the actions of a bank. 
Of course, this reality does not preempt condemnation of both 
banks and regulators for failing to prevent financial disasters. It is 
entirely understandable that we should accuse regulators of being 
asleep at the switch, bamboozled, or even captured. Additionally, to 
the extent that regulators cannot cover a substantial portion of bank 
management decisionmaking, we can also accuse banks of deceptive 
practices when not under the watchful eye of their supervisors, or 
charge them with having pulled the wool over regulatory eyes. But the 
 
 39. See, e.g., Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. & Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20151105a.htm [https://perma.cc/MF4X-JLQG] (expressing concern 
regarding greater risks posed to banks by the collapse in oil prices). 
 40. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It 
Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 187 (2011) (“[T]he highly 
discretionary and continuous nature of bank regulation is dependent on and nurtures an 
environment in which the regulators and the regulated are engaged in such close, daily 
relationships as to nurture . . . codependence [that] might seem inevitably to lead to a mutual 
identification of interests and a manifestation of deep, if not surface, capture.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
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modality of safety-and-soundness supervision makes it extremely hard 
to establish provable violations of law. 
This environment of safety-and-soundness regulation—or, as this 
is coming to be more commonly known, prudential regulation—should 
be clearly understood. Such regulation involves close interaction 
between banks and their supervisors, a constant series of difficult 
judgments on the part of both bankers and regulators, and a complex 
world of decisionmaking in which there is seldom one linear chain of 
events leading to financial loss. This explains why ad hoc, ex post 
private class action suits stand little chance of success in deterring bank 
failures or providing compensation when failures occur. It is also, one 
might submit, one of the reasons for public bewilderment at the lack of 
prosecutions of bankers: the public perception of banker wrongdoing 
likely tracks the market-conduct concept of “fraud” and 
“lawbreaking,” and there were sufficient examples of such activities 
taking place to help generalize the perception to all things that went 
wrong with the banks and the financial system. The enforcement 
actions taken by the SEC and the CFTC, as well as the few successful 
class action suits, were both heavily based on concepts of market fraud, 
and thus might have helped promote the view that far more 
prosecutions ought to have been undertaken. In reality, actions based 
on variants of fraud might well have probed the outer limits of fruitful 
litigation. 
III.  DYNAMIC AND ADAPTIVE REGULATION 
If traditional legal methods of reparation are inadequate, we are 
then left with the problem of preventing widespread banking failure 
and the damage such failure wreaks on interconnected institutions, the 
public, and the economy in general. The policy answers range from one 
extreme (pure market discipline) to the other (tight regulatory 
discipline or control). As a society, we have tended to choose a position 
somewhere in between. Yet we now find that this choice—a 
combination of market discipline and regulatory discipline—is hotly 
contested. Whereas for most of the period from the Banking Act of 
1933 to the 2008 crisis the overall compromise between market and 
regulatory discipline had seemed reasonably satisfactory, the view that 
market and regulatory failures had “caused” the 2008 crisis led to two 
nearly irreconcilable solutions. One argued for intensified-market 
conduct, prudential regulation of individual financial institutions and 
general financial stability regulation, which are each among the major 
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principles embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act.41 The alternative 
advocated further deregulation, and was promoted by those who 
argued that faulty government intervention was the problem in the first 
place.42 
Only the most extreme proponents of pure market discipline 
would take the view that government regulation has very little role to 
play.43 Even leading bankers believe that the financial markets cannot 
operate properly without some degree of government regulation.44 So, 
except where reduced to the level of the reality television of the 2016 
presidential campaigns, the debates center around the degree of 
regulation, its cost, and how much of it is effective or, alternatively, 
counterproductive. Regulators and the adherents of intensified 
regulation rightly point out that for the stricter regulatory agenda to 
work, regulators need to be better resourced. Yet opponents of current 
and any increased levels of regulation point to many areas in which this 
regulation might be ineffective, counterproductive, or smothering in its 
compliance requirements. Nowhere does this seem to be more true 
than in the case of smaller banks, which lack the resources required to 
 
 41. The intensification of prudential regulation was the central objective of Title I of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). Dodd-Frank mandated a host of 
regulations designed to impose much closer scrutiny over banks by regulators. For a review of the 
numerous regulations mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act and progress in their implementation, 
see DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT (2016), https://www.
davispolk.com/publications/dodd-frank-progress-report-six-year-anniversary [https://perma.cc/
84SZ-UXKZ]. 
 42. See, e.g., JOHN A. ALLISON, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FREE MARKET CURE: 
WHY PURE CAPITALISM IS THE WORLD’S ONLY HOPE (2012). Examples of government failures 
that are often cited are market distortions created by national housing policy; moral hazard 
associated with overbroad depositor protection; and monetary policies promoted by the Federal 
Reserve, such as unrealistically low interest rates, that led to the buildup of risk in the financial 
system and eventually to bubbles and crises. 
 43. After the 2008 crisis, a majority of the American public believes that we should regulate 
banks more, not less. See, e.g., THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, 
AUTO BAILOUT NOW BACKED, STIMULUS DIVISIVE 4 (2012) (indicating levels of support for 
current, less, and more regulation of banks). Underlying this aversion to governmental regulation 
is the strong belief that market discipline tends to be more effective. See, e.g., John A. Allison, 
Market Discipline Beats Regulatory Discipline, 34 CATO J. 345, 345–48 (2014) (expressing 
skepticism at the intentions and effectiveness of governmental regulation of banks). 
 44. See, e.g., Letter from Jamie Dimon, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, JPMorgan Chase 
& Co., to Shareholders 46 (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-
relations/document/ar2015-ceolettershareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2DQ-2QKC] (“By any 
reasonable measure, the financial system is unquestionably stronger [since the 2008 crisis], and 
regulators deserve a lot of credit for this. . . . Some people speak of regulation like it is a simple, 
binary tradeoff . . . . We believe that many times you can come up with regulations that . . . create 
a stronger system and enhance growth”). 
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develop and maintain compliance platforms that can cope with the new 
regulatory regimes erected by the regulators in the wake of the passage 
of the Dodd-Frank Act.45 
There is an even greater underlying problem that renders public-
policy debates about better financial regulation somewhat sterile. We 
use models that have to some extent worked in the past in the 
traditional arena of market-conduct regulation, such as enforcing 
against easily proven violations of prophylactic rules stipulated in 
advance for appropriate market behavior. Yet this model has not had 
central relevance to the important mission of maintaining and 
promoting safe and sound conduct, as opposed to policing lawbreaking, 
which is essential for preserving the prosperity and stability of banking. 
It is true that banks are occasionally brought down by outright fraud or 
conduct so reckless that it is easily considered a violation of the 
rules—Barings Bank, destroyed by the bets placed by Nicholas Leeson, 
always comes to mind.46 But the majority of financial difficulties caused 
by banks, or in which banks find themselves ensnared, are the result of 
a variety of factors other than fraud: bad business judgment (leading to 
unsafe and unsound financial conditions or conduct); sudden and 
unexpected “endogenous” events such as the collapse of certain 
industrial sectors (energy) or badly managed switches in central 
banking policy (for example, delinking the Swiss franc, Chinese 
government reversals in recent months, and the failure by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to raise interest rates at the 
proper time in the buildup to the 2008 crisis); major “macro trends” 
(for example, long-term interest-margin squeezes and 
disintermediation by nonbanks); and the surges of boom-and-bust 
cycles that banks find themselves unable to resist.47 These are all 
features of the complex adaptive nature of financial markets, which are 
 
 45. See, e.g., Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 
21−25 (Harv. Kennedy School Mossavar-Rahmi Ctr. for Bus. and Gov’t, Working Paper No. 37, 
2015), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/74695/1687293/version/1/file/Final_State_
and_Fate_Lux_Greene.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PTF-44R7] (presenting an extensive economic 
study which found that regulatory burdens are falling particularly harshly on smaller banks). 
 46. On the Barings Bank collapse, see generally STEPHEN FAY, THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS 
(1996). See also supra note 28. 
 47. The author of this Article is an adherent of the views of the late Hyman Minsky, who 
developed the “Instability Hypothesis” that demonstrates why boom-and-bust cycles are inherent 
to financial markets. Among Minsky’s extensive work, the following is an excellent example of 
his contribution to the field: Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Jerome Levy 
Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 74, 1992), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/
wp74.pdf [https://perma.cc/X68V-C492]. 
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themselves constantly labile and dynamic. Such features have always 
been inherent in financial markets. 
If the markets inherently possess characteristics of complexity and 
dynamism, it is interesting that we only reached the point of bitter 
controversy over the past couple of decades. This Article presupposes 
that the reason for this recent discontent is that the major 
disagreements on bank regulatory policy are rooted in the buildup of 
formalism in enforcement powers and regulator–bank relationships, 
which began in reaction to the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Up to that point, 
banking regulators were able to interact with the financial markets and 
industries they regulated in a fairly dynamic and adaptive way. Safety-
and-soundness regulation was highly discretionary, as banks operated 
within a relatively definable structure created by the banking 
legislation of the 1930s.48 The notion of minimum capital itself only 
became a significant regulatory principle in the early 1980s.49 
Furthermore, banks were small enough, and their activities simple 
enough, for the task of “manual” supervisory regulation to be 
adequately staffed and discharged by the banking regulators. 
As the scandals unearthed by the S&L crisis exploded in the late 
1980s, it became apparent that all kinds of excesses had been permitted 
to savings-and-loan institutions by regulators who appeared 
underpowered, docile or complacent, or captured—in some cases all 
three.50 Public anger at what was thought at the time to be a very 
 
 48. The parent statute for the major banking reforms of the New Deal was the Banking Act 
of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. This statute introduced reforms such as federal deposit insurance, the 
Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and investment banking, and increased powers for 
regulators to enforce bank safety-and-soundness regulations. See id. For a convenient history, see 
Julia Maues, Banking Act of 1933, Commonly Called Glass-Steagall, FED. RES. HISTORY (Nov. 
22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25 [https://perma.cc/DK2P-
DSHC]. 
 49. For example, the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 
Stat. 1278 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901−3911 (2012)), was partially enacted in 
response to a Fifth Circuit ruling that regulatory imposition of minimum capital requirements 
went beyond the regulator’s powers. See First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the 
Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 687 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 50. Vivid expressions of congressional dissatisfaction with the performance of the regulators 
occurred during both the S&L crisis and the 2008 crisis. In 1989, Congress abolished the old 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and its deposit insurance arm, supplanting the regulatory 
functions over thrift institutions into a new agency within the Treasury Department called the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the insurance functions within the FDIC. See The S&L 
Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/
sandl/ [https://perma.cc/P44N-H9R9] (offering a chronology of events during the S&L crisis and 
the legislative aftermath). The continuing ineffectiveness of the OTS, particularly in its failure to 
provide adequate supervision over the thrift subsidiary of AIG, led to its own abolition and the 
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sizeable bailout led to strong reactions in Congress, which passed a 
succession of statutes that intensified and formalized the enforcement 
powers of the banking regulators and also criminalized many more 
financial activities.51 
Although this reaction might have been politically appropriate, it 
had the effect of formalizing the relationship between regulators and 
the industry. What had long been a flexible and deliberative 
relationship between banks and their regulators, very seldom rising to 
the level of actual enforcement action against a bank and almost never 
becoming a public issue, became one in which regulators possessed and 
in some cases were specifically required to exercise very far-reaching 
powers. Many bank executives were sent to federal prison,52 and the 
overall regulatory modus vivendi acquired a stronger adversarial tinge. 
To a certain extent, regulatory discretion has become a notion 
deeply mistrusted in a Congress to which the regulators must in turn 
answer if anything goes wrong.53 These trends, combined with various 
 
transfer of its functions to the OCC under the Dodd-Frank Act. For a chronology of events during 
the 2008 crisis and the legislative aftermath, see Events, FED. RESERVE HISTORY, 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/Graphicalview/15 [http://perma.cc/5J45-2HEP] and 
the links cited therein. 
 51. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 
(2012)); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (including PCA); 
Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50 U.S.C.). The Dodd-Frank 
Act further extended the enforcement powers of the financial regulators. For example, the SEC 
was given additional authority to impose civil money penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings, 
Dodd-Frank § 929P (amending § 8A of the Securities Act, § 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, § 9(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act, and § 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act), 
and the OCC was given extended visitorial powers over national banks by section 1047 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (amending § 5136C of the National Building Act). 
 52. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Hundreds of Wall Street Execs Went to Prison During the Last 
Fraud-Fueled Bank Crisis, MOYERS & CO. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/2013/09/17/
hundreds-of-wall-street-execs-went-to-prison-during-the-last-fraud-fueled-bank-crisis/ [https://
perma.cc/Y8F9-C724] (interviewing one of the leading prosecutors involved at the time). 
 53. A view of the supposed evils of regulatory discretion is held by some in the markets. For 
example, see prominent blogger Steve Randy Waldman’s observation (accompanied by serious 
argument) that “[an] enduring truth about financial regulation is this: [g]iven the discretion to do 
so, financial regulators will always do the wrong thing.” Discretion and Financial Regulation, 
INTERFLUIDITY (Nov. 16, 2009, 3:15 AM), http://www.interfluidity.com/posts/1258156478.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/T4MC-GWGH]. Of course, the overall reasons for regulatory failure are much 
more complex than an incapacity on the part of regulators to make good decisions. See generally, 
e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN (2014) (explaining that deep 
structural factors are to blame for government failure, rather than which party is in charge). 
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economic misfortunes, have tended to pit industry and regulators 
against each other—a model simply incompatible with the 
requirements of ever-changing, fast-moving, and often volatile 
markets. Moreover, the evolving adversarial model has demanded 
resources on the part of the regulators, resources that Congress has 
been reluctant to provide. For example, the SEC and the CFTC were 
given a large range of new mandates to regulate the financial markets,54 
yet their budgets were not correspondingly increased to match these 
new demands.55 It is true that the prudential regulators largely fund 
themselves through the fees imposed on their industries, but even 
raising these imposts has served further to fracture cooperation 
between regulators and their banks. 
So we have drifted far from the kind of regulatory model that can 
be productive and viewed in a positive light by both the industry and 
the public. To regulate modern markets effectively, regulators must be 
able to exercise broad discretion when deciding whether to intervene 
to stop certain activities deemed potentially dangerous to the 
institution in question. They require regulators who can keep pace with 
the markets and apply meaningful, continuous supervision. And they 
require sophisticated technology to match the demands of modern 
banking. Simply prohibiting activities, a strategy that has been 
advocated by those who blame “innovation” as a cause of the 2008 
 
 54. Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No 11−203, 124 Stat. 1822 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 921 (2012)) (Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX) (conferring extensive new 
enforcement powers on the SEC and the CFTC). 
 55. See, e.g., Stewart Bishop, GOP Senate Spells Tight Budgets for SEC, CFTC, LAW360 
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/591224/gop-senate-spells-tight-budgets-for-sec-
cftc [http://perma.cc/9C74-U4TZ] (describing the refusal of the Senate, then newly controlled by 
the Republican Party, to provide adequate funding for the CFTC and the SEC); Richard Hill, 
SEC, CFTC Funding Flat in Senate Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 16, 2016), http://
www.bna.com/sec-cftc-funding-n57982074254 [https://perma.cc/9MZE-KZMD] (describing the 
flat funding by the Senate Appropriations Committee for fiscal year 2017, despite White House 
requests for increases to cope with new burdens imposed on these agencies). The CFPB has 
received special treatment in that its budget has been tied to revenue derived by the Federal 
Reserve. Nonetheless, the GOP-controlled Congress, with strong industry support, has 
repeatedly tried to change this funding mechanism to reduce the amount of funding the CFPB 
receives. For a recent example, see Ian McKendry, House Spending Bill Includes Big Changes to 
CFPB, AM. BANKER (July 8, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/house-
spending-bill-includes-big-changes-to-cfpb-1090107-1.html [http://perma.cc/G88M-5EWF] 
(reporting on a spending bill approved by the House, which would fundamentally restructure the 
CFPB and change its funding—interpreted by the opposition as an attack on the effectiveness of 
the CFPB). 
BAXTER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  2:42 PM 
588  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:567 
crisis,56 is not an option: just as water will always find a way around 
barriers, such innovation would simply move almost instantly to the 
shadow banking arena, where there is even less supervision and an 
even lesser chance of such supervision being effective.57 Finally, 
structural reforms that would segregate segments of the financial 
industry along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act58 can only go so far in 
preventing interconnections between these segments. The 
interconnections themselves continue to require some kind of 
supervision.59 What is required for effective prudential supervision is a 
regulatory framework that is capable of rapid adaptation, that is 
genuinely feasible in the hands of budget-constrained regulators, and 
that automates data and compliance monitoring so that important 
matters entailing expert discretionary judgment can be isolated, 
subjected to dedicated regulatory assessment, and, where necessary, 
subjected to further action. 
We talk and act, however, in terms that do not fit this dynamic 
nature of markets. We use and promote prophylactic rules that fail to 
recognize the labile nature of matters that must be regulated. The 
 
 56. See, e.g., Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Finance: Before the Next Meltdown, 14 DEM. J., 
Fall 2009, http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/14/finance-before-the-next-meltdown [https://
perma.cc/3TY3-34F9] (“[F]inancial innovation stands accused of being complicit in the financial 
crisis that has created the first global recession in decades.”). The literature on whether and how 
financial innovation contributed to the 2008 crisis is vast. See, e.g., Thorsten Beck, Tao Che, Chen 
Lin & Frank M. Song, Financial Innovation: The Bright and the Dark Sides (Jan. 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991216&rec=1&srcabs=1986922&alg=1&p
os=5 [https://perma.cc/6QPS-WBA2]. 
 57. Some scholars have attempted to develop a framework along the lines of the Food and 
Drug Administration’s drug-approved process for approving “innovative” banking products. E.g., 
Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 90−93 (2012); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial 
Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1348−56 (2013). These thoughtful attempts seem quaintly out of touch 
with the nature of modern financial markets; they seem highly unlikely to be adopted by policy 
makers, and the efforts to restrict innovation would likely project a similar departure to the 
shadow markets.  
 58. The Glass-Steagall Act was a principal component of the Banking Act of 1933. Among 
other provisions, four key sections (sections 16, 20, 21, and 32) severely restricted the ability of 
banks to engage in securities underwriting, Banking Act of 1933 § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012), 
forbade affiliation between commercial banks and investment banks, Banking Act of 1933 § 20, 
48 Stat. 162 (repealed 1999); Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378, and prohibited bank 
directors and management from also performing such functions on investment banks, and vice 
versa, Banking Act of 1933 § 32, 48 Stat. 162 (repealed 1999). 
 59. A prominent former regulator has made this point again very recently. See Eugene 
Ludwig, Unregulated Shadow Banks Are a Ticking Time Bomb, AM. BANKER (Mar. 15, 2016), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/unregulated-shadow-banks-are-a-ticking-time-
bomb-1079892-1.html [https://perma.cc/RV5Z-Z3E2].  
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circumstances facing financial institutions change constantly. When an 
industrial sector suddenly encounters difficulties, the complexion of a 
bank’s portfolio can change almost overnight. Without extensive 
discretion, management (let alone regulators) cannot adapt quickly to 
reposition and adjust. Except at the most abstract levels, it is difficult 
to provide regulatory guidance in advance. Prophylactic rules quickly 
become part of the problem themselves, either because they lose their 
initial suitability to market conditions or because they are easily 
circumvented to the extent that they form target regulation, around 
which any rational actor would quickly adapt.60 It is said that “markets 
demand certainty,” yet markets are never certain for long. We accuse 
regulators of having “abdicated” their responsibilities by, for example, 
validating bank risk models instead of creating their own direct 
supervisory models.61 And new permutations of bankers and third 
parties, using highly advanced algorithmic tools,62 are presenting even 
greater challenges. These cannot be ignored by regulators, yet to 
address the challenges such models present requires an entirely new 
mindset and lab-like experimentation. If we continue to assume a 
command-and-control model of regulation, we cannot hope to produce 
a regulatory capacity capable of meeting the need for supervision and 
oversight of modern financial markets. In short, we need to think in 
terms of dynamic regulation when it comes to the safety of our financial 
institutions and the stability of the financial system itself. 
This is not to suggest that market-conduct regulation and victims’ 
market-conduct class action suits are ineffective or irrelevant. But such 
mechanisms only police the miscreants of the market. Notwithstanding 
emotive labels (“banksters,” for example), it seems reasonable to 
 
 60. For a discussion of Goodhart’s Law, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 61. See, e.g., IMAD A. MOOSA, THE MYTH OF TOO BIG TO FAIL 88 (2010) (suggesting that 
regulators relied too heavily on the ratings agencies instead of making their own assessments); 
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (2010) (describing the difficulty of regulating financial risks); Baxter, 
supra note 15, at 839–41 (describing the impact of regulatory reliance on bank risk-management 
models); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial 
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 129–34 (2009) 
(arguing that regulatory reliance on bank risk modeling was in effect an abdication of regulatory 
responsibility). 
 62. The field of algorithmic finance, which is essentially computer-driven financial activity, 
is already vast, covering such fields as statistical arbitrage strategies, high-frequency trading, 
agent-based finance, and machine learning. See, e.g., ALGORITHMIC FINANCE, http://algorithmic
finance.org [https://perma.cc/PY7S-BVRU]. The academic journal Algorithmic Finance is 
devoted to publishing academic articles on the subject, and it maintains archives. See id. (follow 
“archive on SSRN.com” hyperlink under “Archives” heading on right-side column). 
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assume that most bankers, perhaps the vast majority, are trying to do 
the right thing just like everybody else.63 Market-conduct defalcations 
require punishment, not only to provide compensation to victims but 
also to send signals to the market as to the boundaries of acceptable 
conduct. Prudential regulation, however, is a very different enterprise 
not easily amenable to or effective in the use of punitive tools, except 
where market participants simply refuse to conform to reasonable 
supervisory requirements. It is for these purposes that we must 
continue to develop a more appropriate model of dynamic financial 
regulation. 
A. Avenues of Development 
Notwithstanding the misgivings that many experts have about the 
efficacy of the reforms introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act64 and the 
many years of its subsequent regulatory implementation,65 a good case 
can be made that the legislation and its regulations readjusted the focus 
of government regulation in various desirable directions. Indeed, a 
failure by regulators to make such adjustments is itself creating great 
perils.66 
First, the systemic framework within which the health of banks 
and overall financial stability must be preserved has been elevated in 
importance. Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act67 created a new Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and a research agency, the Office 
of Financial Research (OFR).68 The purpose of these reforms was to 
 
 63. The shocking Wells Fargo fraud scandal, in which two million fraudulent accounts were 
opened, five thousand employees were fired, and the CEO was forced to retire, might suggest 
otherwise, yet even that example would seem to be the exception that proves the rule, and it 
would certainly be wrong to accuse the large majority of Wells Fargo bankers of fraud. See, e.g., 
Renae Merie, Wells Fargo CEO Steps Down in Wake of Sham Accounts Scandal, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/10/12/wells-fargo-ceo-
to-retire-in-wake-of-sham-accounts-scandal [https://perma.cc/RY62-MHXF] (reviewing the 
scandal and its consequences). 
 64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).  
 65. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 41.  
 66. See Bamberger, supra note 61, at 677–97 (describing compliance’s dependence on 
technology itself, which in turn creates all kinds of perils, effectively transferring monitoring and 
the interpretation of compliance adequacy from regulators to programmers within the financial 
institutions themselves). 
 67. Financial Stability Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5374 (2012). 
 68. Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (creating the FSOC); id. § 152, 12 U.S.C. § 5342 
(creating the OFR). The Federal Reserve Board had also created a new committee called the 
Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research (OFSPR), now the Division of Financial 
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understand better the dynamics of the financial markets as a whole and 
the areas from which instability might evolve. The FSOC has the power 
to designate nonbank financial institutions, including financial-market 
utilities such as exchanges and clearinghouses, as systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs), subject to increased capital and 
other regulatory requirements.69 The statute itself also identifies a 
whole class of big banks as systemically important banks (SIBs).70 
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act intensified the level of regulation to 
which SIFIs, bank holding companies, foreign banking organizations, 
and nonbank SIFIs are now subject.71 The regulatory powers of the 
prudential agencies, in particular the Federal Reserve, were 
substantially enhanced so that macroprudential (systemic) and 
 
Stability, to coordinate its significant research resources. These entities (the FSOC, OFR, and 
OFSPR) are all designed to gather better economic data concerning potential areas of financial 
instability, and to provide better analysis of what this data signifies and where the trends in 
financial threats are heading. See, e.g., About the OFR, OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 
https://financialresearch.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/7KSP-ETKS] (describing and reporting on 
the functions of the OFR); Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/UB3K-NF
Z9] (describing the structure and functions of the FSOC); The Economists: Financial Stability, 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
fsprstaff.htm [https://perma.cc/6YPN-2PM6] (describing functions of and personnel in the 
division). 
 69. The enhanced regulatory requirements are contained in Titles I and III of the Dodd-
Frank Act. Section 165 of the Act requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations 
for enhanced prudential supervision, including the application of strict liquidity, risk 
management, and capital standards, of and to large U.S. bank holding companies and foreign 
banking organizations. Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365. These regulations were 
promulgated in a final rule in early 2014. Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding 
Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations (Regulation YY), 79 Fed. Reg. 17240 (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2015)); see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 
(Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140218a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EHY9-FWJV] (providing a convenient outline of the contents of the very 
complex and lengthy rule). In addition to the enhanced regulation of large holding companies, 
banks above a certain asset size are subject to direct enhanced regulation by their primary 
regulators, for example the OCC. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 39, 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (2012) 
(as amended by FDICIA, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 132, 105 Stat. 2236, 2267–2270). For the OCC’s 
rules, see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-45, 
HEIGHTENED STANDARDS FOR LARGE BANKS: INTEGRATION OF 12 CFR 30 AND 12 CFR 170 
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2014/bulletin-2014-45.html 
[https://perma.cc/FF33-C9VQ]. 
 70. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a)–(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)–(b) (requiring more stringent 
standards of supervision for banks and bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of 
$50 billion or more). 
 71. Id. §§ 161–176 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
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microprudential (safety-and-soundness)72 issues are under more 
comprehensive surveillance by the banking regulators. 
Finally, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve were given much more 
extensive powers over banking organizations and, potentially, 
nonbanking organizations. They may now require forward planning on 
the part of these organizations for situations of instability and possible 
eventual failure (“orderly resolution plans” or “living wills”), and they 
may also require rapid resolution in the event of failure on the part of 
a particular financial institution.73 
Reforms were also directed toward market conduct and the 
visibility of market activities. Among many other reforms, the SEC and 
the CFTC obtained extensive new powers to regulate the over-the-
counter derivatives market and its key institutions,74 while the newly 
created CFPB75 acquired extensive powers to regulate “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive” financial practices involving consumers.76 These 
reforms, involving better disclosures, tighter rules regarding 
counterparties and borrowers, and much more extensive reporting, are 
significant extensions of the general and long-standing principles of 
market regulation. Apart from violations of the relevant laws and 
regulations, however, the extended framework of market regulation 
continues to be aimed at market abuse, not preventing the failure of 
the financial system itself. 
All of the measures just described—systemic-risk regulation, 
enhanced regulation of individual institutions, and market 
transparency and fairness regulation—were designed to strengthen 
 
 72. Macroprudential regulation focuses on the systemic elements of financial stability: for 
example, how financial institutions interact with each other, how macroeconomic trends affect 
the stability of financial institutions, and how financial institutions can affect overall financial 
stability. Microprudential regulation focuses on the soundness, management, and financial health 
of individual institutions. 
 73. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201–217 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394). 
 74. Id. §§ 701–74 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.).  
 75. Id. §§ 1001–1100H (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). The supervision 
and minimum requirements of many banking activities were also substantially strengthened, 
including: investing, id. §§ 901–91 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), engagement 
with private equity and hedge funds, id. § 619 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 and known as the 
“Volcker Rule”), and granting mortgages, id. §§ 1400–1498 (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
 76. The CFPB was made the primary enforcing agency for these purposes. Id. § 1031(a)–(b), 
12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(b); see also id. § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (protecting consumers from “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination”); id. § 1031(b)–(d), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5531(b)–(d) (defining “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices” and authorizing 
rulemaking for further definition).  
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macroprudential and microprudential regulatory powers. In other 
words, they were designed to promote financial stability in general, and 
bank safety and soundness in particular, to avert a significant bank 
failure or another crisis, the source of so much damage to consumers. 
The strengthened disclosure and governance regimes of market-
conduct regulation were also designed to enlist the discipline of the 
market to complement the oversight of regulators. Market and 
regulatory discipline would combine to preserve honest and stable 
finance. 
Herein lies a dilemma: just as markets fail for various reasons, 
including information asymmetry,77 agency problems,78 and moral 
hazard,79 so too do regulations. This failure can occur by reason of 
capture; because of insufficient resources and conflicting missions; and, 
most importantly for present purposes, because the regulatory model 
struggles to keep pace with the ever-changing marketplace. Despite all 
the developments in nearly a century, our regulatory model—and 
indeed, Congress itself—continues to presuppose a relatively static 
ecology that can be regulated, disciplined, and punished according to 
command-and-control techniques. Chief among these techniques are 
prescribing rules of conduct and condition in advance; requiring 
regulatory surveillance for compliance with these rules; and dictating 
ensuing regulatory action, ranging from mild enforcement to outright 
seizure of institutions,80 when it becomes evident that an institution has 
not or will not comply. This model appeals to the normative ideal of 
the rule of law, and it appears to be mitigated by conferring discretion 
on regulators who know when they should act mildly or harshly. But it 
does not work well anymore. 
 
 77. Information asymmetry occurs when one party lacks the same quality or degree of 
information as its counterparty and is therefore unable to bargain on equal terms.  
 78. Market failures caused by agency problems occur when management pursues objectives 
that are not necessarily the same as those of the institution’s shareholders or not necessarily for 
their benefit. 
 79. Moral hazard, a concept well known in insurance, exists where the risks and costs of a 
particular action are borne by someone other than the actor, leading the actor to take undue risks 
because she or the institution will not have to pay for the costs of errors. Financial regulation is 
riddled with moral hazard problems, the most well known of which is the notion of “too-big-to-
fail” institutions that will be kept alive no matter how incompetent because the general public or 
taxpayers would have to bear the cost of their failure. See supra note 61. 
 80. Under the “prompt corrective action” system, regulators can seize an institution while it 
is still technically solvent but its capital has fallen below a threshold level of two percent. See 12 
U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3) (2012) (authorizing the responsible agency to place a critically 
undercapitalized institution into conservatorship or receivership). 
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First, as already discussed, markets are highly dynamic, labile, and 
adaptive.81 Rules and reforms are quickly outdated. Indeed, they are 
sometimes downright iatrogenic: new rules designed to fix one problem 
might well create a host of new problems.82 Old rules that were based 
in long-forgotten good sense can be swept away before their value is 
fully appreciated.83 And target-based regulation is often self-defeating 
for the simple reason that market participants quickly and rationally 
adjust their behavior around the “certainty” created by the new 
targets.84 
To cope with the demands of regulating financial markets, it seems 
that, more than ever, greater emphasis must be placed on developing 
forms of “adaptive regulation,” as opposed to command-and-control 
regulation. The concept of adaptive regulation is evolving as a new 
field of exploration in administrative law,85 yet in some ways for 
financial regulation it would also constitute a return to, albeit requiring 
substantial modernization of, bank safety-and-soundness regulation.86 
Second, because of the increasing formalization of our regulatory 
framework and the escalating, politically attractive yet ineffective from 
 
 81. See supra Part I.A. 
 82. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK: 
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 39, 40–41 (1998) (providing examples of regulations aimed at curbing 
risk that may create additional risks). This phenomenon is sometimes known as the “Cobra 
Effect.” 
 83. This is sometimes referred to as the “paradox of Chesterton’s Fence,” after an 
observation in the great author G.K. Chesterton’s 1929 book, THE THING:  
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain 
and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists 
in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence 
or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it 
and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent 
type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t 
let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me 
that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.”  
G.K. CHESTERTON, THE THING 35 (Sheed & Ward 1957) (1929).  
 84. For a discussion of Goodhart’s Law, see supra note 20. 
 85. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar, 128 S. 
AFR. L.J. 253 (2011) (arguing that conceptual frameworks for regulating complex markets are 
moving away from directive models in favor of adaptive approaches); Lawrence E. McCray, 
Kenneth A. Oye & Arthur C. Petersen, Planned Adaptation in Risk Regulation: An Initial Survey 
of US Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 
951 (2010) (surveying U.S. federal regulatory programs concerning the environment, health, and 
safety to ascertain which ones have included adaptive features); Jonathan B. Wiener, Better 
Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447 (2006) (suggesting that regulatory reforms 
in Europe should place greater emphasis on ex post evaluation and adaptive management). 
 86. For a discussion of flexible safety-and-soundness regulation, see supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
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a regulatory point of view, reliance by Congress on command-and-
control edicts, financial regulation has become highly adversarial.87 
Whereas in an older time a concern on the part of a regulator might be 
worked out informally with the financial institution concerned long 
before trouble arose, our modern distrust of regulatory discretion, 
coupled with the severe consequences of enforcement and the 
increasing power of financial institutions, often results in politically 
polarized clashes between industry and regulators, on the one hand, 
and between partisans on relevant congressional committees, on the 
other. The consequences are generally not productive. 
B. What Might Dynamic Financial Regulation Look Like? 
The dyspeptic condition of modern financial regulation suggests a 
need for some substantially new approaches. Identifying such 
possibilities involves understanding financial markets as complex 
adaptive systems containing fragile strata, exhibiting constant 
evolution, and requiring multidisciplinary approaches to their 
maintenance.88 Viewed from this perspective, command-and-control 
rules are no more than skeletal restraints. Regulators require 
considerable ongoing discretion. Equally importantly, they need 
resources similar to (though not necessarily in the same quantity as) 
those being used by the agents within the markets themselves. Under 
this view, the regulators are also market agents. It is for this reason that 
adaptive regulation has such an important role to play and command-
and-control regulation is so often ineffective. One of the major U.S. 
market regulators, the CFTC, has itself recognized the need to rethink 
financial regulation, emphasizing principles-based approaches, to meet 
the demands of technology-driven financial markets.89  
 
 87. For concrete examples of this growing formalism, see supra note 51 and accompanying 
text. 
 88. For a discussion of the application of complexity science to financial regulation, see supra 
note 15 and accompanying text. 
 89. See, e.g., J. Christopher Giancarlo, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Keynote Address Before the Cato Institute’s Conference on Cryptocurrency: The Policy 
Challenges of Decentralized Revolution (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-14 [https://perma.cc/M27R-SE9W] (emphasizing the need for 
global coordination by regulators, who should “create a principles-based approach” and take a 
“pragmatic and flexible approach” to the regulation of new technologies (quoting Masamichi 
Kono, Financial Services Agency, Japan, Remarks at CFTC International Regulators’ Meeting 
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/conference/danwa/20160315/01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/956D-WXKP])); Timothy Massad, Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Keynote Address Before the World Federation of Exchanges Annual Meeting, Doha, Qatar (Oct. 
19, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-29 [https://perma.cc/
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Apart from the obvious need to respond to recent developments 
in technology, there is nothing new in an argument for greater 
regulatory discretion in financial regulation. Principles-based (as 
opposed to rules-based) regulation, which recognizes the importance 
of continuing discretion for regulatory supervision, has long been the 
focus of debates on optimal regulation.90 The recognition that cycles 
generate crises has led regulators to think in terms of countercyclical 
regulation, such as capital “buffers” and contingent convertible bonds91 
that morph from debt into equity as circumstances change.92 Turning 
to the arena in which we have seen the biggest impact of technology, 
Pillar 2 of both Basel II and Basel III93 represent an attempt by 
regulators to adapt to highly advanced and perpetually evolving 
 
2PHS-V7ES] (calling for domestic and global market regulators to consider ways to transform 
regulatory oversight in light of technological innovation and market transformation).  
 90. See generally JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS (1997) (offering an analysis of 
the relationship between rules and rulemaking and the regulatory process, with a special focus on 
financial-services regulation); Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 
3 CAP. MKTS. L. REV. 425 (2008) (exploring different forms of principles-based regulation and 
comparing this regulatory strategy’s strengths and weaknesses to those of traditional rules-based 
regulation). For an example in the specific context of banking regulation, see Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The ‘Principles’ Paradox, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 175, 176 (2009) (arguing that the efficacy 
of principles-based regulation versus rules-based regulation is influenced by the type of 
enforcement regime).  
 91. Contingent convertible bonds are bonds that only convert to equity upon the contingency 
of a specified event such as the stock price of a company breaking through a predetermined price. 
They are used in financial services to convert bondholders to equity holders when capital falls 
below desired levels, thereby eliminating the debtholder status of the owners of the bonds and 
strengthening the equity at stake. See, e.g., Definition of Cocos, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/
Term?term=cocos [https://perma.cc/F5YS-LWRX].  
 92. Countercyclical regulation is designed to impose protective burdens, such as higher 
capital requirements, on financial institutions when they and the economy are doing well or, in 
the case of debtholders, to require the conversion of their debt into equity once an institution falls 
below required capital levels so that debtholders share in the losses alongside equity holders. The 
idea is that when an institution gets into trouble or the economy turns bad it is too late to impose 
such burdens because this will only make things worse for the institution. See generally, e.g., 
Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181 (2016) 
(reviewing the mechanisms of, and tradeoffs resulting from, countercyclical regulation). 
 93. Pillar 2 of Basel II and Basel III is the supervisory review process articulated in the two 
major international standards of banking supervision. For an initial description, see BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PT. 3: THE SECOND PILLAR—SUPERVISORY REVIEW 
PROCESS 204–42, https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DEV-XGFZ]. This 
document has been superseded by ever more elaborations of the Basel framework. Basel II was 
introduced in the early 1990s as a more sophisticated framework for managing risk, assessing 
capital adequacy, and ensuring consistency in regulatory supervision across the globe. When 
Basel II proved inadequate in preventing the 2008 crisis, the Basel Committee set about creating 
more refined standards, now contained in a complex and convoluted mélange of documents under 
the rubric of Basel III. See Basel III: International Regulatory Frameworks for Banks, BANK FOR 
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [https://perma.cc/U5AS-2RGJ].  
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models of risk management.94 And modern capital stress testing is 
becoming more dynamic.95 Indeed, one commentator postulates that 
stress testing is effectively displacing traditional safety-and-soundness 
supervision.96 
Quick reflection, however, would reveal that requiring regulators 
to be endowed with such tools is a very tall order. The scale, operations, 
and complexity of modern financial institutions and even the markets 
themselves are immense.97 Manual surveillance of automated activities, 
for example, is entirely unrealistic, and the automation of many of the 
regulatory tasks traditionally performed manually seems imperative. 
Indeed, one leading administrative lawyer has opined that “Robot 
Regulators Could Eliminate Human Error,”98 and for many aspects of 
monitoring, he might well be right. 
 
 94. Basel II was the primary international standard for bank regulation. Although not 
mandatory within jurisdictions, regulators, including those within the United States, based their 
regulation of large banks on these standards. See History of the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/UM3E-7G
V5]. Pillar 2 of Basel II required regulators to monitor risk-management models used by banks 
to ensure their adequacy. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, PART 3: THE SECOND PILLAR–SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS 6−9 (2006), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS9L-3WLS] (outlining the “Supervisory 
Review” process).  
 95. Stress testing is applied by bank regulators to determine whether an institution could 
withstand adverse conditions resulting from economic changes. See, e.g., Pavel Kapinos, 
Christopher Martin & Oscar Mitnik, Stress Testing Banks: Whence and Whither?, J. FIN. PERSP. 
(forthcoming 2016) https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/CFR/2015/WP_2015/WP2015_07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RJ9X-3GDL] (reviewing how stress testing was developed, how it is 
implemented, and how it is likely to further develop). 
 96. Peter Conti-Brown, Stress Tests and the End of Bank Supervision, REGBLOG (Apr. 21, 
2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/04/21/stress-tests-and-the-end-of-bank-supervision/ [https://
perma.cc/E5YU-8QMG]. 
 97. The prudential banking regulators are not as resource constrained as their market-
conduct counterparts; they fund their operations from fees charged to the banks, whereas the 
primary market-conduct regulators are obliged to seek funding from congressional 
appropriations in the current antiregulation environment. This small degree of independence, 
however, is not enough to make up for the kinds of resources a command-and-control form of 
regulation would require. Not only are there limits to the kinds of fees regulators can get away 
with when charging the industry itself, but there are also limitations on how effective such 
regulation could be, even in a world of unlimited resources.  
 98. Cary Coglianese, Robot Regulators Could Eliminate Human Error, REGBLOG (May 16, 
2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/05/16/coglianese-robot-regulators-eliminate-error [https://
perma.cc/PEP2-XVC2]. 
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C. RegTech 
RegTech, the application of technology to regulatory activities,99 
is where thinking about regulation has to change. Although 
discretionary regulatory judgments are as important as ever, if not 
more important, they have to rest on a much more complex base of 
data, data tracking, and inferences, themselves a reflection of the 
enormous complexity of modern finance. Much of this analysis 
requires the aid of automation, so that regulators are able to apply their 
expert knowledge to what really matters from a regulatory perspective. 
Just as finance is rapidly becoming automated, so too must 
regulation. Billions of dollars are being poured into the deployment of 
technology in finance, and this has led to a whole new “FinTech” 
industry that might, for the first time ever, be reforming the entire 
framework of financial services, from high-frequency trading to fraud 
prevention to personal wealth management.100 Mobile phones, for 
example, are revolutionizing how consumers expect their financial 
services to be provided. And these developments are combining at 
stunning rates of change.101 FinTech is the new buzzword for the 
legions of companies and banks that are now developing high-speed, 
automated products and services, using novel techniques including 
 
 99. For an explanation of RegTech, see generally INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING, 
https://wwwiif.com/file/14970/download?token=vx29uy05 [https://perma.cc/VKM6-HP8L]; 
Douglas W. Arner, János Nathan Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the 
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2016) 
[hereinafter Arner, Barberis & Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of 
Financial Regulation], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847806 [https://perma.cc/7JXB-VM53]; 
Douglas W. Arner, János Nathan Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech: A New 
Post-Crisis Paradigm? (Univ. of H.K., Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015/047, 2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676553 [https://perma.cc/L84G-F6QA] (summarizing developments in 
RegTech).  
 100. See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of 
Financial Regulation, supra note 99 (manuscript at 23). 
 101. The literature on one major example in the financial markets, namely high-frequency or 
“algo” trading, is exploding, as are the regulatory concerns. The leading thinkers on this issue are 
Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee. See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW 
MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING 
INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT 
AND THE ECONOMY (2011); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND 
MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 
(2014). See also KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2016) (summarizing 
algo trading dynamics succinctly).  
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blockchain (distributed ledgers),102 cloud computing, big data, 
component architectures, predictive coding, pattern analysis, and many 
other technology-enabled platforms, processors, and delivery 
systems.103 
It is not unrealistic to expect that the regulation of these activities 
might also develop in the same direction. Regulators have hundreds of 
examiners at each of the big banks, but it seems unlikely that adding 
more and more individuals to their teams will help them to meet the 
challenge of big bank supervision. Notwithstanding possible cultural 
resistance by regulators themselves, the development of automated 
compliance, reporting, and monitoring is perhaps inevitable because it 
is hard to see how they will otherwise meet the demands of regulating 
extreme financial complexity. Large amounts of automation might be 
our only hope for cabining the gigantic and dynamic financial industry 
within the limits of safety and fair conduct. 
There have been precursors to this development. Currency 
transaction reporting, involving millions of daily transactions, is 
monitored by the Treasury Department on an automated basis.104 Both 
market-conduct and prudential regulators monitor high-frequency 
trading using automation techniques.105 Perhaps the clearest example 
of major collaboration of algorithmic industry and regulation is the 
implementation of the regulatory-supervision components of Pillar 2 
 
 102. One example of this is the proof of concept performed by R3. See R3, http://r3cev.com 
[https://perma.cc/Z8UQ-NGAQ]; Kim S. Nash, Key Blockchain Vendors, Cloud Providers 
Square off in Major Test, WALL STREET J.: CIO J. (Mar. 2, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/
cio/2016/03/02/key-blockchain-vendors-cloud-providers-square-off-in-major-test/ [https://perma.
cc/89Z5-SS95].  
 103. See U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., FINTECH FUTURES: THE UK AS A WORLD LEADER 
IN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (2015) (presenting a survey focused on London, a leader in the 
field of financial technologies).  
 104. Regulations promulgated under The Bank Secrecy Act require banks to file 
electronically a Currency Transaction Report for every transaction of more than $10,000. 31 
C.F.R. § 1010.311; see Currency Transaction Reporting—Overview, FED. FIN. INST. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_017.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LC93-4CER]. 
 105. For example, the SEC has implemented a system (called “MIDAS”) that combines 
advanced market-activity monitoring with empirical data to provide a better picture of what is 
taking place in the market. According to the SEC, MIDAS collects about one billion records from 
the proprietary feeds from each of the thirteen national equity exchanges. See MIDAS Market 
Information Data Analytics System, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/market
structure/midas.html#.WAD1mzsyDFl [https://perma.cc/CX7V-SJ5Q]. Apparently the system 
will only be fully operational in three years. See Francine McKenna, Critics Say SEC’s Audit Trail 
Plan Falls Short, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 27, 2016, 12:51 PM), http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/critics-say-secs-audit-trail-plan-falls-short-2016-04-27 [https://perma.cc/Y6QC-VFT2].  
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of the Basel II and III frameworks of risk management.106 From a 
command-and-control perspective, regulators’ reliance on the 
automated risk-management systems adopted by big banks seems to 
be an abdication of regulatory responsibility: regulators are expected 
to do such monitoring themselves and not rely on the systems installed 
by the banks. Yet from the premises adopted in this Article, which 
emphasize the constant fluidity and adaptive character of financial 
markets107 and the resource constraints under which regulators have to 
operate,108 it seems entirely unrealistic to assume that regulators could 
even remotely supply the personnel power to perform their own 
evaluations of the risks incurred by complex finance. 
For this reason, this Article urges that we recognize the 
importance of a companion development to FinTech, namely 
RegTech,109 which involves the development, testing, and deployment 
of automated systems of compliance, reporting, and surveillance by 
regulators. Initial work on such a project has begun in many areas. The 
Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom has a “regulatory 
sandbox” in which innovative pilot models are being tested with the 
banks.110 The United Kingdom,111 Singapore, China, and Hong Kong 
 
 106. As risk management has become more automated and complex, regulators have had to 
increasingly rely on the bank’s own risk-management models to discharge their regulatory 
responsibilities. The approach they adopt is effectively codified in national implementations of 
Basel II and, now, Basel III, which require them to evaluate and approve the bank risk-
management models (“supervisory review”). See supra note 94. The bank models are highly 
automated and could not realistically be replicated by the regulators themselves. Highly 
complicated distinctions are drawn in the way in which various categories of banks are treated. 
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL STANDARDS—REGULATORY 
CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (RCAP), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.
htm?m=3%7C14%7C587 [https://perma.cc/68N3-8UGH] (surveying progress around the world 
in implementing the Basel framework); see, e.g., FED. RESERVE SYS., BASEL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/USImplementation.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9SDN-MA47] (providing a digest of the rules promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve to implement the Basel framework in the United States). 
 107. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 109. See U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 103 (presenting a helpful and quite detailed 
outline of RegTech’s potential in modern bank regulation); see also Arner, Barberis & Buckley, 
FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, supra note 99 (manuscript 
at 30–43). 
 110. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA), REGULATORY SANDBOX (2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB62-4V
YM] (providing an overview of the regulatory “sandbox” and its implementation). 
 111. See, e.g. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., BUSINESS PLAN 2016/17, at 32−33 (2016), https://
www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/business-plan-2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/234J-RJ3V]; 
FCA, supra note 110. 
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have provided some government sponsorship112 for RegTech pilots, 
and the U.S. OCC might be receptive.113 A recent report by the 
Institute of International Finance114 outlines the many areas in which 
RegTech has begun to emerge in the United States. Tentative 
examples are to be found in the fields of shareholder disclosures,115 
trading-behavior analysis,116 trading compliance,117 organizational trust 
dynamics,118 and even capital regulation119 (particularly in stress testing 
and risk weighting). A major, and possibly even transformative, 
development has been IBM’s acquisition of the leading regulatory-
compliance consulting firm, Promontory Financial Group, for the 
express purpose of introducing the immense artificial-intelligence 
analytics of Watson to the tasks of regulatory compliance and 
monitoring.120 
 
 112. See, e.g., Arner, Barberis & Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis 
Paradigm?, supra note 99 (manuscript at 20−28) (discussing developments in Asia). 
 113. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE 
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2016), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-
responsible-innovative-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2MJ-79QD]. 
 114. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 99, at 3–4. See generally Arner, Barberis & Buckley, 
FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, supra note 99; DELOITTE, 
REGTECH IS THE NEW FINTECH: HOW AGILE REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY IS HELPING FIRMS 
BETTER UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THEIR RISKS (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/performancemagazine/articles/lu-how-agile-
regulatory-technology-is-helping-firms-better-understand-and-manage-their-risks-24052016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R5YG-RK5N]; Lucy McNulty, Regtech: Meet the New Faces of Compliance, FIN. 
NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016), http://thetally.efinancialnews.com/2016/01/meet-new-faces-compliance/
?mod=fintech-tally [https://perma.cc/T2EG-WLZJ] (listing new RegTech companies). The 
Financial Times has a special section on FinTech that also focuses on RegTech. FIN. TIMES, THE 
FUTURE OF FINTECH, https://www.ft.com/reports/future-of-fintech [https://perma.cc/4T63-
V69F]. 
 115. E.g., FUNDAPPS, https://www.fundapps.co [https://perma.cc/MM48-NAGR] (organizing 
regulatory information and offering a cloud-based system for shareholder-disclosure filings across 
global jurisdictions). 
 116. E.g., SYBENETIX, http://www.sybenetix.com/solutions/compass [https://perma.cc/X7XW
-KZDQ] (providing systems to monitor market activity and detect unusual trading patterns). 
 117. E.g., OPENGAMMA, http://www.opengamma.com [https://perma.cc/E8EF-NVN6] 
(offering margin-calculation solutions for clients). 
 118. E.g., STARLING, http://starlingtrust.com [https://perma.cc/37HT-MJSJ] (stating a mission 
“to uncover the world’s trust networks”). 
 119. E.g., SUADE, http://suade.org [https://perma.cc/RC4H-95UY] (providing a regulation-as-
a-service platform in collaboration with regulators and regulatory models). 
 120. The acquisition was announced in September 2016 and has been greeted by the financial 
industry as introducing a whole new order of computing power to the field of financial regulation. 
See Penny Crosman, IBM Buying Promontory Clinches It: RegTech Is Real, AM. BANKER (Sept. 
29, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/ibm-buying-promontory-
clinches-it-regtech-is-real-1091692-1.html [https://perma.cc/7E7E-L3DR]; John Mannes, Watson 
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The potential of these new possibilities remains barely discernible, 
but it does seem that automation will produce an ever-expanding range 
of regulatory techniques. Among the most well-publicized examples of 
productivity-enhancing automation in the regulatory field is 
blockchain, the underlying technology of Bitcoin,121 which holds out 
the promise of automated authentication and verification across a 
broad range of activities that regulators have traditionally had to 
monitor “by hand.”122 There is also automated trading compliance123 
and an emerging vista of collaborative monitoring between regulators 
and financial institutions themselves, such that the data that are 
produced by the systems of the institutions are themselves also coded 
to provide pertinent regulatory information automatically.124 
 
Financial Services Is Born Out of IBM’s Purchase of Promontory Financial Group, TECHCRUNCH 
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/29/watson-financial-services-is-born-out-of-
ibms-purchase-of-promontory-financial-group/ [https://perma.cc/E5GH-XMYG] (commentary 
and analysis); Press Release, IBM, IBM Announces Planned Acquisition of Promontory to 
Transform Regulatory Compliance with Watson (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www-03.ibm.com/
press/us/en/pressrelease/50599.wss [https://perma.cc/K5M4-CNX4] (announcing acquisition to 
create “Watson Financial Services”). The IBM–Promontory deal has been compared with other 
recent alliances between financial organizations and advanced digital-computing companies, such 
as NASDAQ and Digital Reasoning, as well as Credit Suisse and Plantir. See Ben Dipietro, The 
Morning Risk Report: IBM-Promontory Deal Marks Growth of AI-Driven Compliance, WALL 
STREET J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 3, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2016/10/03/the-morning-risk-report-ibm-promontory-deal-marks-growth-of-
ai-driven-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/4PAY-J4BM].  
 121. See, e.g., Pete Rizzo, KPMG: Blockchain Could Be ‘Antidote’ to High Cost of Regulation, 
COINDESK (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/kpmg-blockchain-antidote-regulatory-costs/ 
[https://perma.cc/RKZ8-5KW7] (summarizing responses by professional-service firms to the 
evolving blockchain-technology space). Blockchain is a data-transport system that permits the 
creation of decentralized ledgers, such that intermediaries can be bypassed altogether and smart 
algorithms can be introduced, for example, to remove previously human tasks involved in 
validating agreements to create self-executing “smart contracts.” While Bitcoin, a crypto- or 
digital currency, is a better-known concept to the public, blockchain, the technology upon which 
Bitcoin depends, has a much broader range of potential applications. For a crisp description of 
blockchain, see, for example, Steven Norton, CIO Explainer: What Is Blockchain?, WALL STREET 
J. CIO J. (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/02/cio-explainer-what-is-
blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/CS9L-8Q5A].  
 122. For example, money could be “wired” directly from a payor to a payee without the need 
for the transfer to go through an intermediary such as SWIFT, and self-validating stock 
transactions could be made directly between buyer and seller without the need for a 
clearinghouse. See Norton, supra note 121. 
 123. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 124. For a broadening range of possibilities, see, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE, BLOCKCHAIN—THE 
TRUST DISRUPTER (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Credit-Suisse-
Blockchain-Trust-Disrupter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PYK-RJ5X]; INST. INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 99. 
BAXTER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  2:42 PM 
2016] ADAPTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION 603 
Of course, the new development, discipline, and promise of 
RegTech will not displace the need for constant adjustments to the 
models to keep pace with the changing marketplace. Nor would it 
eliminate a constant need to handle exceptions to automated 
notifications, fix bad algorithms, and so on. Regulatory judgment based 
on experience and changing overall circumstances will continue to have 
a central role to play, so high-quality regulators will continue to be 
indispensable. For example, data can produce signals of financial 
activity gone awry, but regulatory discretion is still needed to 
determine whether specific trends are sufficient cause for concern to 
warrant regulatory intervention. “Big picture” macroprudential issues 
and public-policy goals that transcend the immediate interests of 
specific institutions, all matters with which regulators are likely to be 
better acquainted than businesspeople focused on the immediate 
concerns of their businesses, have to be factored into decisions about 
whether regulatory action is becoming necessary. Regulators would 
need models and algorithms, but these would not simply be the same 
ones developed and used by the banks that they regulate, because 
regulatory supervision and operational risk management are separate 
activities serving distinct purposes. The former are designed to serve 
the public purpose, and the latter are designed to promote the 
profitability of the bank. 
Finally, the regulator-set algorithmic rules would themselves 
embody as many policy choices and legal validity issues as the 
regulations governing the conduct or circumstances in question. 
Regulators would have to demonstrate that their systems are reliable 
and that whatever discretion is being exercised in establishing and 
maintaining such systems is within the scope of their legal authority. In 
short, regulators would continue to play critical roles; they would just 
rely much more on automation than is presently the case and is how we 
presently conceive the role of regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, none of these proposals would counter the arguments 
of those who believe regulation to be inherently suspect or regulatory 
discretion to be inherently untrustworthy.125 Nor would they satisfy 
 
 125. Skepticism about the value of regulation and regulators has long been a feature of public 
choice theory. More recently, in the context of financial regulation, it is found in various formats. 
See, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 42, at 5−6; Mark A. Calabria, Dir. Fin. Reg. Studs., Cato Inst., 
Remarks at the University of Minnesota School of Law: Financial Regulation: Market or 
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those with a punitive mindset. In addition, it would be naive to imagine 
that automated supervision would eliminate political controversy, 
since the bases for disagreeing on policy solutions rest on different 
views of economic behavior and regulatory effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, although some wrongs can be righted by private-
attorney-general suits, the central challenges of bank soundness and 
financial stability cannot really be addressed effectively through such 
mechanisms. For those of us who continue to believe that regulatory 
moderation of markets is essential, and believe in the merits of 
pursuing the goal of an ideal balance between market discipline and 
regulatory discipline, this Article suggests that we will attain more 
productive and effective results by seeking a modernization of 
regulation along similar lines to the modernization of our technology-
driven finance and technology-oriented society itself. 
If this view is correct, then automation not only presents unique 
new solutions but also great challenges for financial regulation. The 
successful development of financial RegTech will entail a complex 
blend, on the one hand, of accurate and well-articulated algorithms 
that can reduce to automation a large array of essentially mechanistic 
analyses and, on the other, of a series of flexible and skillfully identified 
public-policy judgments that will promote the values of stability, 
fairness, efficiency, transparency, and manageability all that partisans 
presumably hold as their ideal. This goal is a very tall order, but it will 
not be attained through ham-handed legislation, regulation, or blunt 
resistance. It will only be achieved over time, with the introduction of 
many new skill sets and a positive desire to create a financial system 
that is regulated reasonably and for the common weal. 
 
Government (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/financial-regulation-
market-or-government [https://perma.cc/G4UP-FRYV] (stating that regulation generates moral 
hazard and that regulators have the wrong incentives to do the right thing). See also supra text 
accompanying note 53. 
